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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, I have had the good fortune of encountering Kant’s writings on 
ethics from three distinct perspectives: as a student, both undergraduate and graduate; as a 
teacher of Kant’s ethics; and as a philosophical scholar attracted to Kant’s ethics but also 
genuinely troubled by the objections that are raised against it. 
This book is intended to serve readers who come from each of these perspectives. In 
particular, I hope that this book will fill a longstanding gap in the literature on Kant’s ethics. 
In addition to Kant’s own voluminous writings on ethics, there is now an even more 
voluminous body of scholarly literature on Kant’s ethics, written in German, English, and 
other languages, comprised of hundreds of books and thousands of published articles. In 
one way, this large body of scholarly literature is a blessing to students, teachers, and 
scholars. Kant’s philosophy is notoriously difficult to penetrate, packed full of obscure 
jargon, cryptically organized, and informed by assumptions Kant often does not bother to 
highlight. Fair to say, then, that Kant achieved his greatness as a philosopher despite, rather 
than because of, the style and presentation of his works. And since his moral philosophy is 
no exception to this overall tendency, this large body of scholarly literature (we might 
hope) should help readers of Kant’s ethics to grasp at least the main ideas and insights that 
Kant offers. 
Regrettably, the existing scholarly literature does not altogether fulfill this hope. For 
one, much of this literature succumbs to gross oversimplification. Introductory textbooks 
on ethical theory, for example, often reduce or distort core Kantian ideas, depicting it as a 
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morality focused on ‘good intentions’ or acting on the basis of broad, exceptionless rules. 
On the other hand, much of the literature is unhelpful to newcomers to Kant’s ethics in 
particular because it sticks too close to Kant’s own language and presentation. I firmly 
believe that getting a foothold in Kant’s ethics requires us to acknowledge Kant’s 
shortcomings as a philosophical stylist, seeing Kant’s style not as a feature of his 
philosophy to be admired but as an obstacle we need to work around. Unfortunately, much 
of the scholarly literature does not take this difficulty seriously enough, and, as a result, 
does not help newcomers to Kant’s ethical works ascertain the assumptions and 
motivations that drive Kant’s writings on ethics. Hence, those who read this literature often 
leave it with no deeper understanding of Kant’s ethics than they could glean from their own 
reasonably careful reading of Kant’s own ethical texts. As a result, there is not, in my 
estimation and in the estimation of many philosophers I know, a piece of secondary 
literature to assist readers, particularly those new to Kant or to moral philosophy, in 
grasping the main claims and overall significance of Kant’s ethics. 
This book aims to fill that role. However, I have striven to give readers more than an 
acquaintance with, or conceptual mastery of, the main claims or arguments Kant makes. I 
have written the book to try to help readers perceive why Kant’s ethics is viewed as a 
viable candidate for the true (or the best) philosophical theory of morality. The book is 
therefore best described as an opinionated analytical introduction: opinionated, in that I 
try to present Kant’s moral theory not in a neutral way, but to defend the theory in a 
sympathetic way; analytical, because it seeks to relate the various components of Kant’s 
ethics to one another and to his moral theory as a whole; and an introduction, because it 
presupposes little if any familiarity with Kant’s ethics. As will emerge in these pages, Kant 
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was hardly infallible in his thinking about morality. Nevertheless, he articulated and 
integrated insights about morality that many thoughtful, reflective people can recognize 
and embrace. 
This book thus differs from other secondary literature on Kant’s ethics in some 
crucial respects. First, it is not a ‘big book’ on Kant’s moral philosophy that tries to offer a 
careful, textually based interpretation of all the elements of Kant’s moral philosophy. 
Hence, there is a substantial portion of Kant’s writings on ethics and related areas that I 
will not touch upon. I will have fairly little to say, for instance, about Kant’s anthropology, 
philosophy of religion, political philosophy, or philosophy of history, all of which inform his 
theory of morality. 
Second, Kant was a deeply systematic philosopher. He did not theorize about ethics 
in isolation from his theorizing about metaphysics, human knowledge, cognition, nature, 
etc. No doubt a thorough grasp of Kant’s ethics demands a thorough grasp of the other 
elements of his philosophical system. However, this book assumes that readers know little 
about Kant’s philosophical enterprise as a whole and thus attempts to outline and motivate 
his ethics with minimal reference to non-ethical texts or ideas. Admittedly, this complicates 
the task of understanding Kant’s ethics, and there are certain topics (for example, Kant’s 
discussion of freedom of the will) where claims from elsewhere in Kant’s philosophy 
cannot be avoided. Still, my aim has been, to the extent possible, to present Kant’s ethics as 
a freestanding theory. 
Third, a book such as this must confront the fact that the work through which 
virtually everyone is introduced to Kant’s ethics is his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals. The Groundwork sets the agenda of the early portions of this book inasmuch its 
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early chapters are oriented around the Groundwork’s central project: identifying and 
establishing the supreme principle of morality. That said, this book is not intended to be a 
commentary on the Groundwork, and it presents Kant’s ethical thinking in ways that 
diverge significantly from their presentation in the Groundwork. Most notably, in the 
Groundwork, the first version of his supreme principle of morality that Kant presents is the 
Formula of Universal Law. Here, the first version I present of that principle is the Formula 
of Humanity. This deviation from Kant’s own approach in the Groundwork is nevertheless 
warranted. The Formula of Humanity plays a larger role in texts besides the Groundwork, 
tends to be less technical and abstract than the Formula of Universal Law, and provides a 
roadmap for Kant’s account of our moral duties. 
Furthermore, while the Groundwork is indispensable to understanding Kant’s moral 
philosophy, it is likely to give an incomplete, if not outright misleading, picture of Kant’s 
ethical thought when read in isolation. It is therefore unfortunate that many never engage 
at all with Kant’s other ethical texts, for there are important components of his ethical 
thought that Kant does not discuss in the Groundwork. That text says little, for instance, 
about moral psychology, the details of our moral duties, or key institutions such as 
marriage or punishment. The Groundwork has the advantage of being relatively brief and 
directed at core questions in Kant’s ethics. Still, it is a work of limited aims or scope, and 
therefore readers whose sole understanding of Kant’s ethics comes from that work get a 
similarly limited understanding of Kant’s ethics. Thus, when (in my estimation) a central 
Kantian claim or insight can be articulated solely by reference to the Groundwork, I refer to 
that text alone. However, I make liberal use of other Kantian texts when the Groundwork is 
either silent or sketchy concerning the matter at hand. Especially important here will be 
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Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, the work for which the Groundwork was intended as 
preparatory. (Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason plays a prominent role in Chapter 5 and in 
Section 8.8.) My hope is that readers familiar with the Groundwork will thereby come to a 
more thorough understanding of Kant’s ethics without having to plow through the entirety 
of Kant’s ethical writings. That said, I also hope that readers will be inspired to see the 
value of reading outside the Groundwork in order to understand Kant’s ethics. 
For instructors responsible for teaching Kant’s ethics, especially those who are not 
scholars of Kant’s ethics, this book provides a way to organize one’s thinking about Kant’s 
ethics, and, by extension, a way to organize the teaching of Kant’s ethics. Many students 
come to Kant’s ethics with little or no background in Kant’s philosophy or in philosophical 
ethics. They thus understandably struggle to get a toehold on Kant’s ethics and often 
become overly reliant on their instructor’s exposition of Kant’s texts. There is of course no 
substitute for students’ grappling with those texts. Still, Kant’s idiosyncratic style, need for 
systematicity, etc., are a recipe for frustration, and this book is intended to ameliorate that 
frustration without replacing the experience of reading Kant’s texts directly. Students 
should also benefit from the fact that I have attempted to draw contrasts with other ethical 
theories with which students may be familiar (utilitarianism, virtue ethics, intuitionism, 
etc.). 
The book is divided into two parts. Part I consists of five chapters that begin with 
Kant’s stated aim in the Groundwork: to identify and defend the supreme principle of 
morality. One puzzling feature of the Groundwork is that though its first two sections have 
the same general aim  – to identify and defend the Categorical Imperative as the supreme 
principle of morality  – Kant deploys very different argumentative strategies in those 
  6 
sections. Hence, Chapter 1 sets the stage for the first two sections of the Groundwork by 
setting out the criteria Kant believed this supreme principle must satisfy. We then turn in 
Chapters 2 and 3 to the two aforementioned versions of Kant’s supreme principle, the 
Categorical Imperative. Chapter 2 addresses the Formula of Humanity, Chapter 3 the 
Formula of Universal Law. Throughout Part I, I articulate an understanding of Kant’s theory 
of value and how this theory of value provides the underpinning for Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative. As I see it, rational agency is the central value for Kant, and his Formula of 
Humanity and Formula of Universal Law represent or express two distinct ways in which 
rational agency ought to be valued. Chapter 4 outlines an important moral concept Kant 
introduces in the Groundwork: dignity. Appeals to dignity have become popular recently in 
ethics, but Kant’s contributions to these contemporary discussions are sometimes obscure. 
Chapter 5 takes up perhaps the most vexing issues in Kant’s ethics: namely, how Kant 
understands human freedom and its relationship to morality and to the Categorical 
Imperative. 
In Part II, the emphasis turns from exegesis to defense. Over the past two centuries, 
Kant’s ethics has been subject to innumerable criticisms, more than I can answer here. 
However, there seem to be certain criticisms that recur and trouble even those otherwise 
sympathetic to Kant’s ethics. Part II groups these objections into three broad categories 
and gives a spirited but (I hope) fair-minded defense of Kant’s ethics against these 
objections. The first chapter of this section (Chapter 6) addresses three objections 
concerning the Formula of Universal Law: first, that because we are unable to determine 
what principles a person acts upon, we cannot determine whether her actions are morally 
permissible; second, that the Formula of Universal Law gives us implausible verdicts about 
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particular actions; and third, that it implies an implausible sort of absolutism where acts of 
a given kind (for example, lying) are always wrong. Addressing these objections will also 
help answer a vexed question in Kantian ethics, namely, the relations among the different 
formulations of the Categorical Imperative and their supposed equivalence. Chapter 7 
addresses three areas where Kant’s ethical views have been seen as having problematic 
implications: sexual conduct, suicide, and our treatment of non-human animals. The final 
chapter, Chapter 8, answers three criticisms resting on the claim that Kant’s ethics assigns 
reason too prominent a place at the expense of sympathy or other sentiments: first, that 
Kant’s ethics rests on an unrealistic or unattractive moral psychology, wherein we should 
strive to expunge all sentiment or emotion from our moral deliberation and strive to be 
motivated purely by austere rational considerations; second, that Kantian ethics does not 
take due account of the special moral significance we ascribe to our relationships with our 
friends, family, and loved ones; and third, that Kant’s ethics fails to offer a defensible model 
of a happy or well-lived human life and the role of morality in such a life. Answering this 
latter objection leads to a brief discussion of another of Kant’s central moral ideals, the 
Kingdom of Ends, as well a consideration of Kant’s ‘practical postulates.’ 
For philosophers and scholars of Kant’s ethics, there is obviously a great deal here 
that is familiar and (I expect) uncontroversial. Nevertheless, they too stand to benefit 
inasmuch as few books attempt to make the case for Kant’s ethics, or at least its central 
claims or principles, in a direct and compact way. I do defend certain interpretive claims 
that may strike some scholars as novel, though, in the end, I hope that such scholars will 
find these interpretations both provocative and plausible. Of particular interest to scholars 
are my criterial approach to the supreme principle of morality, my emphasis on Kant as a 
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theorist of value, my analysis of respect as the attitude underlying the Formula of 
Humanity, and my ‘rational contradiction’ interpretation of the Formula of Universal Law. 
In the end, I do not expect readers of this book to conclude that Kant’s ethics is 
unproblematic. Rather, I hope this will function as the book I wish I could have had when I 
first encountered Kant’s ethics: a book that does not attempt to indoctrinate, but attempts 
to make the case for Kant’s ethical theory being worthy of study and appreciation as much 
as it makes the case for the correctness of the theory itself. Philosophy students in 
particular need to know not only what Kant said about morality and why. They also need to 
better appreciate why what he said matters  – why, for example, philosophers as estimable 
as John Rawls admired it, or why historically prominent philosophers such as Hegel or Mill 
saw Kant’s ethics as worth criticizing. As I have learned through teaching Kant’s ethics  – to 
date, I have taught Kant’s ethics, in lesser or greater depth, in about forty academic courses 
over a fifteen year span  – understanding Kant’s ethics and understanding its value or 
importance are inextricably linked. 
********* 
Let me conclude this preface with some guidance about how best to read this book. 
Although the book as a whole functions as an argumentative brief on behalf of 
Kantian ethics, I have tried, to the extent possible, to make each chapter sufficiently free 
standing that it can be read (or re-read) without referring to material earlier or later in the 
book. Hence, those wanting insight about certain topics (for example, the Formula of 
Humanity) should be able to consult the relevant chapter (Chapter 2, in this case) without 
having to read from cover to cover. 
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Each chapter concludes with a list of recommended ‘Further Readings.’ These were 
selected not only for their quality, but also to give readers the opportunity to explore 
perspectives on Kant’s ethics different from my own. 
Further Reading 
Among the more useful introductions to Kant’s ethics are Bruce Aune’s Kant’s Theory of 
Morals (Princeton, 1979) and Roger Sullivan’s An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics 
(Cambridge, 1994). Jennifer Uleman’s An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Philosophy 
(Cambridge, 2010) emphasizes Kant’s theory of the will and moral psychology. More 
advanced overviews of Kant’s ethics can be found in Allen Wood’s Kant’s Ethical Thought 
(Cambridge, 1999) and Kantian Ethics (Cambridge, 2007). Readers interested in placing 
Kant’s ethics in historical context will profit from the chapters on Kant’s ethics in John 
Rawls’ Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Harvard, 2000). Some shorter, essay-
length introductions to Kant’s ethics include chapter 7 of Mark Timmons’ Moral Theory 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); David Velleman’s “Reading Kant’s Groundwork,” in G. Sher 
(ed.), Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory (Routledge, 2012); Christine Korsgaard’s 
‘Introduction’ to the Groundwork in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy 
series (Cambridge, 2012); and Andrews Reath, “Contemporary Kantian ethics,” in J. 
Skorupski (ed.), Routledge Companion to Ethics (Routledge, 2012). Marcia Baron’s 
contribution (“Kantian ethics”) to Three Methods of Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell, 1997), pp. 3–
91, is a useful argumentative defense of Kantian ethics that engages with its chief 
theoretical rivals: consequentialism and virtue ethics. J.B. Schneewind’s “Autonomy, 
  10 
obligation, and virtue: An overview of Kant’s moral philosophy,” in P. Guyer (ed.), 
Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge, 1992) is an introduction to Kant’s moral 
philosophy emphasizing autonomy and virtue. Arnulf Zweig, “Reflections on the enduring 
value of Kant’s ethics,” in T.E. Hill (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009) helps readers see the many threads that intertwine in Kant’s ethical theorizing. 
Readers seeking more line-by-line commentary on Kant’s Groundwork can consult Paul 
Guyer, Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide (Continuum, 
2007); Jens Timmermann, Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A 
Commentary (Cambridge, 2010); and Henry Allison, Kant’s Groundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary (Oxford, 2011). Sally Sedgwick’s Kant’s Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals: An Introduction (Cambridge, 2008) is an especially useful 
introduction to that work that helps situate Kant’s ethics within his larger philosophical 
enterprise. 
 
